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Dezzani v. Kern & Assocs. Ltd., 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 9 (Mar. 1, 2018)1 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: ATTORNEYS AS AGENTS UNDER NRS 116.31183 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined that attorneys do not qualify as agents for the purposes of retaliatory 
action under NRS 116.31183 where the attorney is providing legal service for a homeowners’ 
association. The Court further held that an attorney litigating pro se or representing his or her law 
firm may not collect attorney fees but may collect attorney costs. 
 
Background 
 
 David and Rochelle Dezzani own a condo in Incline Village, Nevada. The Dezzanis, as 
well as all other unit owners, are members of the McCloud Condominium Homeowners’ 
Association (HOA). Gayle Kern and her firm (Kern & Associates) represent the HOA. When the 
Dezzanis bought the condo, it had a deck extension that the previous owner had installed. The 
previous owner had received permission to install the deck extension from the HOA board in 2002.  
The HOA issued the Dezzanis a notice of violation stating that their extended deck 
protruded into common area and thus violated the HOA’s CC&Rs. After the Dezzanis responded 
to the notice of violation, Kern contacted them. Kern stated that she represented the HOA and 
restated the HOA’s position on the deck extension. The Dezzanis challenged the notice of 
violation. The HOA board held a hearing and ultimately upheld the notice of violation. 
The Dezzanis filed a complaint against Kern and other parties. The complaint stated that 
Kern retaliated against them based on NRS 116.31183. The Dezzanis alleged that Kern retaliated 
against them because they requested that the HOA retain new legal representation. The Dezzanis 
allege that Kern retaliated against them because they asked the HOA to retain new counsel. Kern 
filed a 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss. The Court granted Kern’s motion and awarded her attorney 
costs and fees. The Dezzanis appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The Court noted that NRS 116.31183 allows for a separate action when an HOA’s agent 
takes certain retaliatory action against a unit’s owner.2 The Court therefore determined that the key 
question was whether an attorney qualified as an agent under this section. 
 
The district court did not err in dismissing Dezzanis’ complaint 
 
 The Court stated that it reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo. To this end, the 
Court will first consider the statute’s plain meaning. The Court also noted that it has a duty to first 
try to read statutes in a way that renders them consistent with other statutes. 
 The Court noted that the word “agent” was not defined anywhere in NRS chapter 116. 
However, NRS 116.31164 uses the words agent and attorney distinctly.3 The Court took this to 
mean that the Legislature meant to distinguish between the two. Since provisions in NRS Chapter 
                                                          
1  Ron Evans. 
2  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 1163.1183 (2017). 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.31164 (2017). 
2 
 
16 use attorney and agent distinctly, the Court concluded that it would be inappropriate to include 
attorneys within the definition of agents under NRS 116.31183. 
 The Court noted that the dissent would have it ignore the rules of statutory interpretation 
that instructs the Court to begin by applying the words’ plain meaning. The dissent would have it 
begin by applying rules of grammar and punctuation. However, grammar and punctuation rules 
are only to be used when the result is clearly consistent with legislative intent. The Court further 
raised an issue with the dissent’s reading of the word “or.” The Court noted that it is instructed to 
read “or” disjunctively unless there is a compelling reason not to do so. While the dissent argued 
that the word “or” should be read as including “attorney” as a subset of “agents,” the Court noted 
that absent clear intent by Congress to not intend “or” be read disjunctively, it would not assign 
controlling weight to a comma. The Court then argued that given the dissent’s reading of the 
statute, attorneys should always be considered a subcategory of agent. However, it is noted that 
Chapter 16 frequently uses the words attorney and agent distinctly when attempting to address 
responsibilities applicable to agents but not to attorneys.  
 The Court also rejected the argument that attorneys should be included as a subset of agents 
under NRS 116.31183 as a matter of public policy. The Court relied on the unique nature of the 
attorney-client relationship that distinguishes it from a typical agent-principal relationship. The 
Court noted that the attorney-client relationship is an agent-principal relationship for the purpose 
of determining whether a client is responsible for the actions of an attorney. However, the Court 
noted that such liability is different from imposing liability on an attorney for adverse actions taken 
against a third party in representing a client. The Court noted that attorneys generally owe no duty 
to adverse third parties when acting solely as legal representation. Further, the attorney-client 
relationship is subject to strict ethical standards. The Court also noted that there is a long history 
of courts treating attorney-client relationships differently from typical agent-principal 
relationships based on factual differences. Given these factors, the Court declined to include 
attorneys as a subset of agents under NRS § 116.31183. Therefore, there can be no liability for 
retaliatory actions under NRS § 116.31183 against an attorney where the alleged retaliatory act is 
providing legal representation for a client. 
 
The district court erred in awarding Kern attorney fees 
 
 The Court noted that the district court awarded attorney fees to Kern under NRS 
18.010(2)(b) and as sanctions under NRCP 11 because it found that the Dezzanis’ lawsuit was 
filed for the purpose of harassing Kern. The Court noted that it reviews a district court’s award of 
attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. The Court has consistently held that attorneys who proceed 
pro se or represent their law firm, they cannot be awarded attorney fees. This is because there are 
no fees to award. The Court cites Sellers v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court for the proposition that 
attorneys fees generally cannot be awarded to pro se attorney litigants.4 The Court held that was 
not the case here. However, the Court did uphold the district court’s award of costs on the ground 
that Kern incurred actual financial costs in representing herself. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In NRS 116.31183, the word “agent” does not include attorneys who are providing legal 
representation for a client. Therefore, an attorney who is merely legally representing their client 
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cannot be held liable for retaliatory conduct under NRS 116.1183. Further, attorney pro se litigants 
who represent themselves or their law firm may not be awarded attorney fees they did not actually 
incur, but may be awarded costs. The Court upheld in part and overturned in part the district court’s 
ruling.  
 
Dissent 
 
 Justice Pickering argued that attorneys are agents, and therefore can potentially face 
liability under NRS 116.31183. After noting that NRS 116.31183 is silent as to the meaning of the 
word “agent,” the dissent turned its attention to NRS 116.31164. While the majority opinion read 
the “or” between the words “attorney” and “agent” as disjunctive, the dissent argued that such a 
reading assumes more than can be supported. The dissent argued that an attorney is universally 
understood to be an agent. The dissent further points to legislative history that it believes supports 
the notion that the Legislature intended to include attorneys within its definition of the word 
“agent” for the purposes of this statute. The dissent argued that this case therefore should not have 
been dismissed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
